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Review
Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global
Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It
Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2010. 360 pp.

Sunil K. Sahu *
Since 9/11 there has been a burgeoning literature on terrorism written by journalists,
scholars, policy makers, diplomats, and military professionals. The last decade has also
witnessed a dramatic increase in suicide terrorist attacks—violent attacks designed to kill
others where the death of the attacker is a necessary part of the action—especially against
American interests. There were twenty suicide terrorist attacks worldwide in 2000, one of
which was anti-American inspired; the number of such attacks increased ten-fold by
2010, 90% of which were anti-American inspired. Although suicide bombing was used
by imperial Japan at the end of World War II, the kamikaze tactics, they have not since
been used by nation states. Instead, non-state actors such as Hezbollah, Tamil Tigers,
Hamas and al-Qaeda have used suicide attacks since the early 1980s, especially in the last
decade. The modern suicide terrorism is usually traced back to the Hezbollah attacks
against Israeli military installations and American assets in Lebanon in 1982, and the
phenomenon has been studied extensively in recent years. Scholars have offered
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explanations of the underpinning of such violent and hostile behaviors and suggested
policy response to such threats.
Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It
by Robert Pape and James Feldman, published in 2010, received media attention that
academic works usually do not get. A professor of political science at the University of
Chicago and a leading authority on suicide terrorism, Pape is the founding Director of the
Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST), which has collected the most
extensive data on all suicide terrorism attacks worldwide from 1983 to 2009. He has been
at the center of the scholarly and policy debate on suicide terrorism since the publication
of his article “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” in the American Political
Science Review (August 2003), considered by some to be the most influential article of
the decade published in that journal; the article was later expanded and published in a
book form entitled Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random
House, 2005).
In Dying to Win, Pape argued that suicide terrorism is more effective than other
kinds of terrorist attacks. Through an analysis of the data on 315 known suicide attacks
committed worldwide between 1980 and 2003, he found that suicide attacks represented
only 3% of all terrorist incidents, but were responsible for 48% of the casualties and
therefore more effective. He further posits that terrorism is not a unique Islamic
phenomenon; rather it is a rational response to occupation, a form of coercion by
punishment. Contrary to the popular belief that suicide terrorism stems from economic
alienation and/or Islamic fanaticism—after all, the overwhelming majority of suicide
attacks in recent years have been carried out by Muslims!—Pape argues that suicide
attacks are aimed at compelling “modern democracies to withdraw military forces from
the territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland” (Pape 2005:4). The suicide
terrorists, in his view, are rational political actors who wage a form of asymmetrical
warfare, using terror to pursue “politics by other means” (to use the Clausewitz dictum).
The hypothesis that military occupation is the root cause of suicide terrorism
was further refined and substantiated with more empirical data and scholarly rigor in
Cutting the Fuse, which Pape co-authored with James Feldman, who taught at the Air
Force Institute of Technology and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. The
argument presented in Cutting the Fuse is based on an analysis of the nearly exhaustive
database of the incidence of suicide terrorism around the world, collected by a team of
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researchers over six years at CPOST. The dataset consists of 2,200 suicide terrorist
attacks, comprising over 10,000 records covering all suicide terrorism attacks from the
first attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon in 1983 to every known attack
until 2009. The book is divided into two parts: the first, consisting of two chapters,
provides an analytic overview, the second part going into well-researched case studies of
large-scale suicide campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Israel and
Palestine, Chechnya, and Sri Lanka, and there is a chapter devoted to transnational
terrorism. The authors contend that since the United States military occupation
of Afghanistan and Iraq, total suicide attacks worldwide have risen dramatically—from
about 300 from 1980 to 2003, to 1,800 from 2004 to 2009. They found that over 97% of
all attacks in the last thirty years were in response to military occupation. For example,
suicide attacks in Iraq, which had no record of such attacks prior to the U.S.-led invasion
in 2003, increased significantly in the five years following the invasion, reaching the
highest level (over 300 attacks) in 2007. Similarly, in Afghanistan, which had
experienced one suicide attack two days prior to 9/11, there was a drastic increase in
suicide attacks, which mirrored the increase in NATO troops in Afghanistan. There were
fourteen suicide attacks in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005, but the number of those
attacks went up to 137 in 2007, which was, according to the authors, a direct response to
the deployment of 11,000 additional U.S. troops in Helmand Province in Southern
Afghanistan alongside the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) redeployment
and to the use of increased airstrikes in 2006.
To prove the thesis that foreign occupation is the common thread tying suicide
terrorism the world over, Pape and Feldman devote a chapter to Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, a secular Marxist-Leninist-inspired terrorist group
with an atheist leader, V. Prabhakaran, who pioneered the use of the suicide vest and
made extensive use of female suicide bombers. LTTE waged four Eelam wars—1983–
87, 1990–94,1995–2001, and 2002–2005—in which it “used suicide terrorism as an
integral part of its military and political strategy [for twenty-six years] to achieve a Tamil
homeland” (316). The group engaged in more than 150 suicide attacks against the hard
targets, as a substitute for military operations they could not compete with by
conventional means, and in the assassination of Sinhala-Buddhist national and local
politicians and policemen; it did not indiscriminately target civilians. The authors,
however, fail to take into account a number of suicide missions that had nothing to do

Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism 245
with occupation but were aimed at the strategic objectives of LTTE—for example, the
assassination of India’s former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1991), the killing of the
entire leadership of its rival Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) along with its
400 radical members (1986–87), the assassination of anti-LTTE Tamil leader
Muthulingam Ganesh Kumar (1999) and of the moderate Tamil Liberation United Front
M.P., Dr. Neelan Thiruchelvam (1999). These assassinations were carried out against
fellow Tamil leaders, not Sinhala-Buddhist occupiers, for strategic reasons. The problem
with Pape and Feldman’s study is also with their definition of occupation, which is too
broad. They conflate foreign occupation with domestic occupation, including the “threat
of occupation,” which is so hard to measure in the absence of cross-national public
opinion survey data. Elsewhere in the book they consider Pakistan as “occupied,” which
defies commonsense, and the stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during and after
the Gulf War leads them to classify Saudi Arabia among occupied countries.
The recent escalation of suicide attacks in Iraq, moreover, does not support the
Pape-Feldman thesis that the end of foreign occupation will greatly reduce and eventually
eliminate suicide terrorism. The number of suicide attacks in Iraq, which averaged
between five and ten a month in 2011 and 2012, rose to thirty a month in the last
few months. Most of the attackers, it is believed, belong to Jabhat al-Nusra (the “Victory
Front”), a splinter organization of al-Qaeda in Iraq coming to Iraq from Syria. Since the
number of Iraqis killed in terrorist bombings, including suicide attacks, reached its high
level of 2008—in July 2013 alone more than 1,000 Iraqis were killed—the Iraqi
government recently asked the U.S. for advisers, intelligence analyses and surveillance
including drones to stop the conflict from further degenerating into a sectarian conflict
leading perhaps to a civil war. Suicide bombing has now become a tool in sectarian
violence in Iraq and elsewhere, which can’t be explained by using the Pape-Feldman
framework.
The evolving situation in Afghanistan may also disprove the Pape-Feldman
thesis. The Taliban carried out 730 suicide attacks between 2001 and 2012, more than
any other group in the world. In the last two years, they have killed more than 820 people
and injured nearly 3,000 in suicide attacks (TOLOnews, 5 July 2013). If there is no
negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan that includes the Taliban before America
withdraws, it is likely that the Taliban will continue and perhaps intensify suicide attacks.
The end of occupation may not end suicide terrorism in Afghanistan.
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Nevertheless, Pape and Feldman's argument that the U.S. must end its
occupation of the Middle Eastern countries and return to the grand strategy of off-shore
balancing to maintain its regional interests is the most viable policy option for the U.S.
The strategy of off-shore balancing has been advanced by neo-realist thinkers such as
Pape, John Mearsheimer, Christopher Lane, and Stephen Walt for over a decade. The
neo-realists argue, contrary to the neoconservatives who dominated the foreign policy
establishment under President George W. Bush and took a regional transformation
approach in the Middle East through a regime change in Iraq, that a great power should
rely on economic and non-invasive measures to prevent the rise of potential hostile
powers or a regional hegemon. The Obama administration’s Middle East policy,
especially its decision to withdraw troops from Iraq and Afghanistan suggest an
endorsement of the off-shore balancing strategy. (Pape was one of Obama’s foreign
policy advisers during his 2008 presidential campaign.)
The current crisis in Syria offers a test case for the neo-realist perspective on
U.S. foreign policy. The conflict is now more than two-years-old and President Obama
has been reluctant to get involved militarily. However, once it was established, in early
September 2013, that the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons
against his own civilian population, President Obama decided to respond by a limited
military strike. But he has also assured the nation and the world that there would be no
American boots on the Syrian soil. Calling the United States "the anchor of global
security" in a prime-time speech on the eve of the 12th anniversary of 9/11 attacks,
Obama offered moral, political and strategic arguments for being ready to launch limited
military strikes while trying to negotiate a diplomatic solution to Syria's violation of a
global ban on chemical weapons. Obama is still willing to give diplomacy a chance, and
has asked the Congress to postpone a vote for now on authorizing military force against
Syria.
Regardless of how the U.S. finally responds and how the Syrian crisis is
resolved, it is unlikely that the U.S. will get involved in another war in the Middle East or
elsewhere soon. While scholars continue to debate whether Pape-Feldman's definition of
occupation is too broad, or whether their methodology is flawed, the informed citizens
and general readers of this war-weary nation faced with fiscal constraints find the
arguments of Cutting the Fuse, backed by rich data, to be persuasive and appealing.
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